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‘FOR THE UNION MAKES US … RICH?’: 
PREVENTING TRADE UNION CORRUPTION 
IN LAW AFTER THE HEALTH SERVICES 
UNION SAGA  
JOEL SILVER∗ 
While uncommon, corruption amongst Australian trade union officials is 
nevertheless well documented and notorious. How the law responds to 
corruption has become the subject of renewed debate, due to allegations 
against several former officials of the Health Services Union, in particular 
Craig Thomson and Michael Williamson. This article argues in favour of 
revising the provisions describing officials’ duties in the federal Fair Work 
(Registered Organisations) Act 2009 (Cth) — the law which regulates trade 
unions — to more closely resemble their sister provisions in the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). It contends that corrupt officials are best 
dealt with under specific ‘disloyalty’ offences, as opposed to generic 
property crimes (such as fraud or obtaining by deception). It also addresses 
a number of other potential weaknesses in the present legislative scheme. 
I INTRODUCTION  
The Commonwealth law that governs the internal affairs of employer, 
employee and enterprise associations is the Fair Work (Registered 
Organisations) Act 2009 (Cth) (‘the Registered Organisations Act’). This Act 
is to associations — employer organisations and trade unions1 — in many 
respects what the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) is to corporations, in so far as 
                                                 
∗ LLB (Hons) (Melb), GDLP (Leo Cussen Institute), Australian Lawyer and Officer of the 
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1 Rather than referring to those three legislative categories, the Fair Work Commission’s 
register of organisations only distinguishes between ‘employer organisations’ and ‘trade 
unions’; as seen in the ‘List of registered organisations’ maintained on its website: Fair Work 
Commission, List of Registered Organisations (17 July 2013) <http://www.fwc.gov.au/index. 
cfm?pagename=regorgslist>. 
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it covers matters such as registration,2 duties of officers,3 whistleblower 
protections,4 and access to records and information.5 Indeed, because trade 
unions cannot be registered with the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (‘ASIC’),6 the Registered Organisations Act is often described 
as a law solely of relevance to the trade union movement. 
The civil obligations of officials and directors under the respective Acts are 
outlined in four nearly identical ‘civil penalty’ provisions first included in the 
former Corporations Law under the 1999 Corporate Law Economic Reform 
Program (‘CLERP’).7 However, while the Corporations Act provides that 
intended or reckless violations of those duties may amount to a criminal 
offence, the Registered Organisations Act — except in draft form8 — has 
never so provided. The effective distinction thereby drawn between trade 
unions and corporations has been questioned in recent years, in the light of the 
significant allegations of corruption levelled against officials of the Health 
Services Union (‘HSU’). 
The HSU faced intense scrutiny throughout the term of the 43rd Australian 
Parliament (2010–13). Specifically, its former National Secretary, Craig 
Thomson, elected as the Member for Dobell in 2007 and 2010, was 
questioned over alleged abuses of his former office. A Fair Work 
investigation into the HSU National Office, despite criticisms made of it, 
played a key role in this.9 Had Thomson been found guilty of a criminal 
offence, he would have been constitutionally disqualified from serving in 
Parliament,10 which would have led to a by-election in his seat. In the likely 
                                                 
2 Under  the Corporations Act s 119, ‘[a] company comes into existence as a body corporate at 
the beginning of the day on which it is registered’, while ss 26 and 27 of the Registered 
Organisations Act make clear that, upon registration as an organisation, an association gains 
the legal personality ordinarily acquired through incorporation (eg, the right to be sued or be 
sued, perpetual succession, to purchase property). 
3 Registered Organisations Act ch 9; Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ch 2D. 
4 Registered Organisations Act ch 11, pt 4A; Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ch 9, s 9.4AAA. 
5 Registered Organisations Act s 280; Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 198F. 
6 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 116. 
7 Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act 1999 (Cth) sch 1, ss 180-190; originally in 
s 82 of the Corporations Act 1989 (Cth) (‘Corporations Law’), now part of the Corporations 
Act 2001 (Cth). Prior to 1999, the former s 232 of the Corporations Law contained equivalent 
duties. This same model is used in the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 
(Cth). 
8 Workplace Relations (Registered Organisations) Bill 2001 (Cth) s 277. 
9 Senate Standing Committees on Education, Employment and Workplace Relations, Report of 
the Delegate to the General Manager of Fair Work Australia: Investigation into the National 
Office of the Health Services Union under Section 331 of the Fair Work (Registered 
Organisations) Act 2009 (28 March 2012) (‘National Office Report’). 
10 Australian Constitution, s 44. 
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event that Dobell would have been won by a Liberal Party candidate, this 
would have caused deadlock in the House of Representatives, resulting in an 
early general election. Although that scenario did not eventuate, Thomson 
resigned from the parliamentary Labor Party in April 2012 (while supporting 
the Labor government on motions of confidence and supply), and in January 
2013 was arrested to face charges in Victoria.11   
The HSU case is a rare example of alleged institutional corruption in an 
Australian trade union. Trade union leaders have in the past been more 
commonly associated with ‘lower end’ misdeeds. The 40 convictions of John 
Setka (Victorian Secretary of Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy 
Union) on charges which included using indecent language, assault, and 
trespass12 are a case in point. Nevertheless, the HSU matter shows that 
corruption can and does occur at a union’s highest levels; crimes can be 
committed within the body against its interests. The question posed by this 
article is: does Australian law make adequate provision for such ‘higher end’, 
white collar misconduct? 
Attempting to find an answer leads to many more questions. The first part of 
this article presents an overview of ‘higher end’ misconduct in trade unions. 
The article then discusses the mixed civil-criminal provisions established 
under CLERP. These provisions are contrasted with overlapping general law 
criminal offences, with an emphasis on their different normative bases, a 
factor that very much determines what conduct falls within their scope. The 
standard of care owed both by corporate non-executive directors and union 
non-official executives are considered, in the context of examining how 
misconduct is pursued under Australia’s industrial relations framework. 
To describe this topic as ‘politically charged’ would be an understatement, 
and indeed the strength of the arguments upon it, perhaps more than on any 
other topic, may be influenced by individual readers’ political persuasions. 
However, it is not the purpose of this article to argue that more trade union 
officials should be gaoled, or that the civil penalties regime in the Registered 
Organisations Act is a failure. Rather, it argues that the HSU saga has 
exposed serious gaps in the laws applicable to union officials, and that, 
without reform, those gaps will continue to be exploited. 
                                                 
11 Kate McClymont, ‘Craig Thomson Arrested by Fraud Squad’, The Sydney Morning Herald 
(online), 31 January 2013 <http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/political-news/craig-thomson-
arrested-by-fraud-squad-20130131-2dmnn.html>. 
12 John Ferguson and Pia Akerman, ‘Rap Sheet Reveals 60 Charges for Would-Be Union Boss 
John Setka’, The Australian (online), 29 August 2012 <http://www.theaustralian. 
com.au/national-affairs/rap-sheet-reveals-60-charges-for-would-be-union-boss-john-
setka/story-fn59niix-1226460322445>. 
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II DEFINING ‘CRIMINAL BREACH’ OF LOYALTY TO A 
UNION 
A Historic Unionist Misconduct 
While the alleged misconduct in the HSU may be unique in its scale, it is not 
entirely without precedent. Several trade unions have been used by their 
officials to facilitate criminal or other corrupt activity. Three unions are worth 
mentioning: the Builders Labourers Federation (‘BLF’); the Federated Ship 
Painters and Dockers Union; and the Australian Workers Union (‘AWU’). 
The affairs of the first two were the subject of investigation by separate Royal 
Commissions. 
Corruption in the BLF concerned several officials, most notably its General 
Secretary, Norman Gallagher, who wielded a ‘special position of influence ... 
within the building industry, and [had a] capacity to turn that influence to the 
disadvantage of major builders’.13 Developers curried favour with the BLF by 
providing clandestine benefits, notably improvements to beach houses owned 
by BLF officials.14 A ‘false billing technique’ was used whereby work was 
performed by subcontractors on existing projects, who concealed the 
arrangement by charging fees to the primary project developers. Gallagher 
himself obtained $160 000 in benefits between 1975 and 1980,15 and had 
charges of corruptly receiving secret commissions recommended against 
him.16 
The Commission into the Federated Ship Painters and Dockers Union — 
dubbed ‘the most powerful criminal organisation in Melbourne in the 1970s’17 
— was established to determine the extent of illegal activities engaged in by 
the union and its membership.18 Along with more gruesome issues (15 
murders and 23 attempted killings were linked to the union), the Commission 
examined the Federation’s involvement in facilitating so-called ‘bottom of the 
                                                 
13 Commonwealth and Victoria, Royal Commission into the Activities of the Australian 
Building Construction Employees’ and Builders Labourers’ Federation, Report (1982) 
244 [3]. 
14 Ibid 31 [1.1], 34 [1.6]. 
15 Ibid 33 [1.5], 38 [1.8], 79 [2.1]. 
16 Ibid 274 [1(a)]; see Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s 176. 
17 Elissa Hunt, ‘Painters and Dockers Union was Linked to a String of Murders in Melbourne in 
1970s Trials’, Herald Sun (online), 18 December 2012 <http://www.heraldsun.com. 
au/news/law-order/painters-and-dockers-union-were-linked-to-a-string-of-murders-in-
melbourne-in-1970s-trials/story-fnat7dag-1226536360779>. 
18 Commonwealth and Victoria, Royal Commission on the Activities of the Federated Ship 
Painters and Dockers Union, Final Report (1984) vol 1, 81 [5.002]. 
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harbour’ tax evasion.19 With the assistance of a ‘promoter’, entities liable to 
pay company tax transferred all assets, except profits, to a new entity. Those 
remaining funds were loaned to third parties — often associated with the 
Federation — who then used the funds to purchase the stripped entity from its 
original owners. This round robin transaction allowed owners to realise their 
full, pre-tax profits,20 with all record of the arrangement sent to the ‘bottom of 
the harbour’ with the original entity.21 If and when tax authorities tracked the 
entity down, further investigation was deterred by the violent reputation of the 
Federation.22  
The allegations concerning the AWU largely involved a Perth-based entity, 
the ‘AWU Workplace Reform Association’ (‘the Association’), controlled by 
its then Victorian and West Australian branch secretaries, Bruce Wilson and 
Ralph Blewitt respectively. The allegations concerned up to $1 million in 
misappropriated funds.23 Established in 1992, on legal advice given by Slater 
& Gordon partner Julia Gillard (Wilson’s then girlfriend), the Association was 
the beneficiary of an agreement with Thiess Contractors. Thiess paid for the 
AWU’s co-operation on a West Australian government-funded project in 
order, as a former official described it, to ‘buy industrial peace’ — much as 
Gallagher and the BLF had done.24  
Under this arrangement, Thiess made monthly payments for over two years to 
the Association, whose bona fides it had failed to investigate.25 A Federal 
Court file reportedly indicates that other construction firms had also made 
payments to the Association.26 The Association was purportedly established 
                                                 
19 Robert Williams, ‘Crime and Corruption in Australia’ (1986) 1 Corruption and Reform 101; 
see also Trevor Boucher, Blatant, Artificial and Contrived — Tax Schemes of the 70s and 80s 
(Australian Tax Office, 2010) chs 39–43. 
20 Commonwealth and Victoria, Royal Commission on the Activities of the Federated Ship 
Painters and Dockers Union, Interim Report No 4 (1982) vol 1, 71. 
21 Commonwealth and Victoria, above n 19, 81 [5.003]; see also 94 [5.028]–[5.030]. 
22 Williams, above n 19, 103. 
23 Steve Lewis, ‘Witness Says He Was Approached by a Builder over Payment for Reno’, 
Herald Sun (online), 11 February 2013 <http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/national/witness-
says-he-was-approached-by-a-builder-over-payment-for-reno/story-fncynkc6-
1226574905765>. 
24 Andrew Burrell, ‘We Put $300,000 in AWU Slush Fund, says Bruce Wilson’s Brother-in-




26 Hedley Thomson, ‘Detectives Intend to Execute Search Warrant to Retrieve a Legal File 
Concerning Bruce Wilson’, The Australian (online), 20 February 2013 <http://www. 
theaustralian.com.au/news/investigations/detectives-intend-to-execute-search-warrant-to-
retrieve-a-legal-file-concerning-bruce-wilson/story-fng5kxvh-1226581489264>. 
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as a re-election ‘slush fund’ for certain AWU officials, but was apparently 
used for Wilson and Blewitt’s personal benefit. In particular, $92 722.30 went 
towards a 1993 house purchase in Fitzroy, Melbourne, made in Blewitt’s 
name.27 No proceeds of the 1996 sale of the house were returned to the 
AWU.28 Some cash, allegedly withdrawn by Blewitt, was buried in the garden 
of his Perth home.29 The existence of other recipient entities has also been 
reported, including the ‘AWU Members Welfare Association (No 1) Account’ 
(into which more than $100 000 was deposited),30 and the ‘Construction 
Industry Fund’, which held up to $60 000, including a $20 000 payment from 
Thiess, and other funds shifted from the Association after Wilson’s ousting.31  
The common thread in these three scenarios is that they involved union 
officials using their positions to make unlawful or corrupt personal gains, both 
through cheating the union itself, and through using the trappings of office to 
cheat and bully others. 
B The Health Services Union 
Although the issues at the HSU are sometimes referred to as the ‘Thomson 
saga’32 in the media, this term inaccurately conveys the impression that Craig 
Thomson acted alone. For while Thomson — who was National Secretary of 
the HSU from 2002 to 2007, and before that, NSW Assistant Secretary 
between 1999 and 2002 — is arguably the most prominent figure in the affair, 
his activities have resulted in the scrutiny of other HSU leaders, notably 
Michael Williamson. 
                                                 
27 Steve Lewis and Ian McPhedran, ‘They’re Out to Get PM, Says Her Ex Union Lover’, 
Herald Sun (online), 22 August 2012 <http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/national/theyre-
out-to-get-pm-says-her-ex-union-lover/story-fndo317g-1226455274192>. 
28 Hedley Thomas, ‘How Robert McClelland Led Pursuit in Union Funds Scandal’, The 
Australian (online), 14 July 2012 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/how-
robert-mcclelland-led-pursuit-in-union-funds-scandal/story-fn59niix-1226425771932> 
29 Pia Akerman, ‘AWU Files Bruce Wilson and Ralph Blewitt Come Clean on Dirty Money’, 
The Australian (online), 29 November 2012 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/ 
investigations/bruce-wilson-and-ralph-blewitt-come-clean-on-dirty-money/story-fng5kxvh-
1226526151502>. 
30 Hedley Thomas and Pia Akerman, ‘Whistleblower Wayne Hem Alerted AWU’s National 
Secretary to $5000 Payment to Julia Gillard’, The Australian (online), 14 November 2012 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/investigations/whistleblower-wayne-hem-alerted-
awus-national-secretary-to-5000-payment-to-julia-gillard/story-fng5kxvh-1226516225346>. 
31 Hedley Thomas, ‘Bruce Wilson’s Exit Didn’t End AWU Fraud’, The Australian (online), 26 
November 2012 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/investigations/bruce-wilsons-exit-
didnt-end-awu-fraud/story-fng5kxvh-1226523852732>. 
32 Ean Higgins, ‘HSU Charges Tipped to Include Craig Thomson’, The Australian (online), 20 
October 2012 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/hsu-charges-tipped-to-
include-craig-thomson/story-fn59niix-1226499631849>. 
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According to the Fair Work investigation, during Thomson’s tenure, the HSU 
National Office ‘abjectly failed to have adequate governance arrangements in 
place to protect union members’ funds against misuse’.33 The bulk of 
misconduct found has been attributed to Thomson himself, and has caused a 
total approximate loss of $500 000.34 The identifiable instances of misconduct 
by Thomson are: his misdirection of HSU resources in his capacity as 
National Secretary (that is, for a purpose, often personal and unauthorised by 
the national executive), and his inappropriate expenditure on his HSU-issued 
credit cards, including the cash withdrawal facility.35 In no particular order, 
this expenditure included: 
• Charges to escort agencies, plus associated costs, including call 
charges to hotel rooms (for calls made to agencies),36 and parking and 
taxi charges incurred in proximity to agencies.37 
• The cost of staying at high-priced hotels when travelling (including 
$880 for one night at Melbourne’s Grand Hyatt).38 
• Considerable dining and entertainment expenses.39 
• The cost of flights purchased in his wife’s name on 14 occasions, on 
13 of which they travelled together.40 
• The cost of establishing an HSU National Office facility in Sydney 
without national executive permission, due to his move there in late 
2005. (The HSU continued to lease its original Melbourne office).41 
• The cost of employing two HSU staff to work solely on his campaign 
for Dobell,42 both of whom received HSU credit cards for working 
expenses.43 
                                                 
33 Fair Work Australia, ‘Statement: Outcome of HSU National Office Investigation’ (Press 
Release, 7 May 2012) 2. 
34 See National Office Report, above n 9, ch 21 at [6], where 181 violations of both the Rules of 
the HSU and Registered Organisations Act were identified, of which 156 are attributed to 
Thomson (98 specifically under the Act). Relevant provisions of the Act are considered 
below. 
35 Ibid ch 5 [172]–[173]. 
36 Ibid ch 6 [6]. 
37 Ibid ch 5 [587]–[590]; see also [109]–[110], [118]. 
38 Ibid [861]–[862]; other examples are available at [1095]. 
39 Ibid [1099]; see also ch 6 [459]. 
40 Ibid ch 6 [541]. 
41 Ibid ch 5 [614], [645], [626]. 
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• The cost of diverting HSU funds into the ‘Coastal Voice’ community 
group, a front used by Thomson to build his profile in Dobell.44 
• Campaign costs in Dobell, including the cost of his office and a 
campaign bus.45 Of note is that, while the national executive of the 
HSU gave no consideration to the Dobell expenditure (as 
documented), such consideration did occur in relation to the Victorian 
division of La Trobe.46 
• HSU donations to several Central Coast organisations, including 
sponsorship of the Central Coast Rugby League,47 and payment to 
‘Dads in Education’ and the ‘Central Coast Convoy for Kids’.48 
Of course, Thomson is not the only HSU official accused of misconduct. Fair 
Work also investigated the Victoria No 1 Branch,49 following allegations that 
the then-President Pauline Fegan had breached her fiduciary duties.50 Fegan 
had arranged the purchase of $147 361 worth of promotional items (such as 
pens and badges) from ‘Urban Giftware’, an entity operated by her domestic 
partner Phillip Grima.51 Despite these related party transactions, it is unclear 
whether Fegan had disclosed her interest in the business, although the 
investigation found insufficient evidence of wrongdoing by her.52 Also under 
scrutiny were Branch Secretary Jeff Jackson, and Assistant Secretary Shaun 
Hudson (who is not discussed here). On three occasions in 2008, Jackson had 
instructed the branch office manager to process $5000 ‘back payments’ to him 
                                                                                                                    
42 Ibid ch 4 [35], [61], [69], [74], [116]. 
43 Ibid ch 5 [380]; see also ch 7 [440]. 
44 Ibid ch 4 [351], [417]. 
45 Ibid [126], [142]–[147]. 
46 Ibid [201]. This seems to indicate that the national executive made a conscious decision 
regarding which electorate would benefit from their efforts, rather than delegating that 
function to the National Secretary. 
47 Ibid [549]–[561]. 
48 Ibid [586]–[590], [610]–[616]. 
49 Senate Standing Committees on Education, Employment and Workplace Relations, Report of 
the Delegate to the General Manager of Fair Work Australia: Investigation into the Victoria 
No 1 Branch of the Health Services Union under section 331 of the Fair Work (Registered 
Organisations) Act 2009 (23 December 2011) (‘Victoria No 1 Branch Report’). The first 
incarnation of the branch merged with the Victoria No 3 and NSW branches to form HSU 
East Branch on 24 May 2010, and was re-established when the Federal Court ordered that 
branch’s disbanding on 21 June 2012; see generally Brown v Health Services Union (2012) 
205 FCR 548. 
50 Victoria No 1 Branch Report, above n 49, [1]. 
51 Ibid 73–5. 
52 Ibid 81–3. 
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(totalling $15 000); in reality, these were an unauthorised additional salary.53 
Proceedings were instigated against Jackson by the branch for the 
unauthorised payments, resulting in a Deed of Agreement for repayment.54  
The most colourful allegations, however, concern Michael Williamson, and 
centre on his long tenure as General Secretary of the NSW branch, and, 
following its merger with Victoria No 1 and No 3 branches, of the East 
branch. (He held that position from 1995 to 2012, having been Assistant 
Secretary from 1987 to 1995).55 In that time, more than $20 million in 
questionable payments were made to suppliers of the union, without any 
tendering taking place or contract being formed, including $5 million to 
companies operated by the Williamson family. In addition, $1.5 million were 
spent on purchasing and renovating a warehouse, then used by Williamson’s 
son (also an HSU official) as a commercial rehearsal studio.56 United Edge, a 
company of which Williamson owned a third, received $4.7 million over four 
years for IT services provided to the branch, which operated rent free from the 
branch office.57 Another company, Communigraphix, held a $700 000 per 
annum contract to produce the branch magazine, and in exchange is alleged to 
have paid for secret credit cards in the names of both Williamson and Craig 
Thomson.58 For these and other allegations, Williamson has been charged 
with 50 offences under NSW law.59 
                                                 
53 Ibid 50. 
54 Ibid 55. As an aside, Thomson alleged to Fair Work investigators that this settlement was 
instead to repay escort charges to a ‘Keywed Pty Ltd’ incurred on a union credit card by 
Jackson (in reality the charges appeared on Thomson’s card). This was shown to be false; see 
National Office Report, above n 9, ch 1 [168], ch 5 [354], ch 6 [17]. 
55 Until 2003, the NSW branch was known as the ‘Health and Research Employees’ 
Association of NSW’; Williamson was also President of the HSU National Office (2003–12), 
and of the federal Australian Labor Party (for 2009–10). 
56 Kate McClymont, ‘HSU: $20 Million of Dubious Spending, Report Finds’, The Sydney 
Morning Herald (online), 24 July 2012 <http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/political-
news/hsu-20-million-of-dubious-spending-report-finds-20120723-22kmi.html>. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ean Higgins, ‘Police Raid Health Services Union Headquarters in Corruption Probe’, The 
Australian (online), 2 May 2012 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/police-raid-
health-services-union-headquarters-in-corruption-probe/story-e6frg6nf-1226344371153>. 
59 Ean Higgins, ‘Ex-HSU Boss Michael Williamson Faces 28 New Charges’, The Australian 
(online), 31 October 2012 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/hsus-williamson-
faces-28-new-charges/story-e6frg6nf-1226507245605>; Ean Higgins, ‘Ex-HSU Boss Michael 
Williamson Faces Two New Charges’, The Australian (online), 9 April 2013 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/ex-hsu-boss-michael-williamson-to-face-two-
new-charges/story-e6frg6nf-1226615574516>. 
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III CORRUPTION AND THE REGISTERED ORGANISATIONS 
ACT — CIVIL PENALTIES 
A Overview 
The ‘higher-end’ misconduct engaged in by some trade union officials is 
subject to federal and state laws and civil and criminal sanctions. 
Union officials are subject to statutory duties under the Registered 
Organisations Act, based on those that bind company directors and officers 
under the Corporations Act, although the penalties to which union officials 
are subject are significantly less severe.60 The statutory duties are fourfold, 
comprising two mandatory and two prohibitive duties.61 The mandatory 
provisions require their subjects to act: 
(1) with the degree of care and diligence which a reasonable person 
would exercise;  
(2) ‘in good faith in the best interests’ of the entity, and for a ‘proper 
purpose’; 
Under the prohibitive provisions a person must not, improperly use either 
(3) their position; or 
(4) information obtained through their position 
for the purpose of gaining ‘an advantage for themselves or someone else’, or 
causing ‘detriment’ to the entity 
As to their interpretation, the common language of the two laws, as well as the 
lack of case law concerning those sections of the Registered Organisations 
Act,62 means that the manner in which a union official is required to execute 
and fulfil his or her duties will be informed by authority and jurisprudence 
developed in the application of the Corporations Act.  
                                                 
60 An individual offender, under ss 306–7 of the Registered Organisations Act, is faced with a 
$2200 maximum pecuniary penalty, compared to $200 000 under s 1317G(1) of the 
Corporations Act; see also Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 4AA. 
61 See Registered Organisations Act ss 285–8; Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 180–3. 
62 The HSU investigations were only the second to take place since the introduction of the 
CLERP provisions; see Additional Estimates, Evidence to Senate Standing Committee on 
Education, Employment and Workplace Relations, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 15 
February 2012, 9 (Bernadette O’Neill, General Manager of Fair Work Australia). 
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B Meaning of ‘Care and Diligence’ 
A corporate officer’s first duty under CLERP is to exercise their powers and 
discharge their duties ‘with the degree of care and diligence a reasonable 
person would exercise’ if they: 
(a) were an officer of an entity in that entity’s circumstances; and 
(b) occupied their office, and had the same responsibilities within the 
entity.63 
The duty has been observed to be not unlike common law negligence in how 
it is assessed,64 the applicable standard being determined by context and 
circumstances. For a company, the relevant context includes the type, size and 
nature of the enterprise it is engaged in, its constitution, the composition of its 
board, and the distribution of work between the board and other officers.65 
However, the applicable standard will also depend on the officer’s particular 
role,66 along with the individual’s particular skills and knowledge. That does 
not mean that a higher order of negligence is required for a breach to occur.67 
By contrast, the duties of a non-executive officer, with the possible exception 
of a company’s non-executive chairman, do not generally extend beyond 
financial matters. For example, seven non-executive directors of James Hardie 
Industries (including the chairwoman, Meredith Hellicar) were held to have 
breached their duties when a misleading statement was issued about the 
sufficiency of funds in the company’s asbestos victims’ compensation fund.68 
John Greaves, the non-executive chairman of collapsed phone company 
One.Tel was judged — having regard to his responsibility for the finance and 
audit committee,69 his accounting background, and his receipt of a $50 000 
remuneration not paid to the company’s other non-executive directors. Taking 
these factors into account, he was said to have an ‘enhanced’ responsibility — 
that of keeping the board informed of the company’s financial status (this duty 
being in addition to ordinary directors’ own ‘continuing obligation’ in that 
                                                 
63 Registered Organisations Act s 285(1); Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 180(1). 
64 LexisNexis, Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law (at February 2012) [8.340]. 
65 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Friedrich (1991) 5 ACSR 115, 125 (Tadgell J), referred 
to in LexisNexis, Australian Corporation Law Principles & Practice (at April 2012) 
[3.2A.0050]. 
66 In companies, their actual responsibilities are particularly to executive officers, such as the 
Chief Executive; see ASIC v Rich (2009) 236 FLR 1, [7206] (Austin J). 
67 See Vines v ASIC (2007) 73 NSWLR 451, 476 (Spigelman CJ). 
68 ASIC v Hellicar (2012) 86 ALJR 522. 
69 ASIC v Rich (2003) 174 FLR 128. 
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respect).70 Arguably, the respective union equivalents of non-official 
executives and non-official presidents are to be held to this same standard. 
Additionally, as is also the case under the Corporations Act’s ‘business 
judgment rule’, an alleged breach can be disproved if an official can 
demonstrate that their ‘judgment’, which was made ‘in respect of a matter 
relevant to the operations’ of the union, fulfilled the four criteria specified in 
section 285(2) of the Registered Organisations Act.71 
C Meanings of ‘Good Faith’ and ‘Proper Purpose’ 
The second CLERP duty comprises two independent obligations, both of 
which must be fulfilled.72 There are, however, differences between the 
Corporations Act and the Registered Organisations Act in this respect. Under 
the former, a director or officer must exercise power and discharge duties: 
(a) in good faith in the best interests of the corporation; and 
(b) for a proper purpose.73 
By contrast, the wording of (a) above in the Registered Organisations Act 
refers to an official acting ‘in good faith in what he or she believes to be the 
best interests of the organisation’.74 These additional words — found in the 
draft CLERP legislation75 — make the applicable test subjective, rather than 
objective as in the Corporations Act.76 Lord Greene MR confirms, in this 
context, that ‘good faith’ is defined by what the relevant official considers, 
‘not what a court may consider’, is in the best interests of the organisation.77 
Under the Registered Organisations Act, the ‘good faith’ requirement is 
breached only if an official deliberately acts in the knowledge that the action 
is not in the union’s best interests.78 This important distinction appears not to 
                                                 
70 Ibid 129. 
71 See also Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 180(2). The meaning of ‘judgment’ is discussed in 
ASIC v Adler (2002) 168 FLR 253, [453] (Santow J). 
72 See generally William Heath, ‘The Corporations Law, Section 181: A Two-Edged Sword’ 
(2000) 18 Companies and Securities Law Journal 377; see also Chameleon Mining NL v 
Murchison Metals Ltd [2010] FCA 1129, [110]; Permanent Building Society (in liq) v 
Wheeler (1994) 14 ACSR 109, 137 (Ipp J), which indicates the equitable duty to act for a 
proper purpose is separate from good faith. 
73 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 181. 
74 Registered Organisations Act s 286 (emphasis added). 
75 Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Bill 1998 (Cth) sch 1, s 181. 
76 Australian Corporation Law Principles & Practice, above n 65 [3.2A.0065]. 
77 Ibid [3.2A.0060]; Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd [1942] 1 All ER 542, 543 (Lord Greene MR). 
78 Australian Corporation Law Principles & Practice, above n 65 [3.2A.0070]. 
2013 PREVENTING TRADE UNION CORRUPTION 139 
have been appreciated by the Fair Work investigation into the HSU National 
Office.79 
Unlike the preceding limb, the requirement for officials to act for a ‘proper 
purpose’ is identical under both laws, and is interpreted with reference to case 
law on discretionary power and collateral or improper purposes.80 As 
fiduciaries, directors and officials do not have unlimited, arbitrary power, and 
must exercise their power only to the end for which it was conferred.81 This 
means that even a wide power, such as power over the ‘whole management 
government and control’ of a company or organisation (absent an explicit 
provision in its constitution or rules to the contrary) must be exercised for a 
proper purpose, and not, for example, for a director’s self-interest.82 To draw 
an example from the Fair Work report, Thomson argued that an item in the 
HSU National Office budget — with the general label ‘travelling and 
accommodation’ — gave him an unrestricted discretion to spend on dining 
and entertainment (an argument which, unsurprisingly, was rejected).83 
In the event that a conflict arises between the interests of the organisation and 
the official (or where there is a ‘real or substantial possibility’ of one arising), 
the official must avoid promoting his or her own interest.84 This is 
complicated where multiple purposes — some proper, some improper — 
exist. The question then becomes whether the ‘substantial purpose’ of an 
action was improper.85 For example, the directors of the Advance Bank 
authorised a campaign against several board candidates, which included 
engaging a marketing firm to contact all shareholders, and a letter from the 
chairman backing the status quo.86 While corporate funds can be used for 
internal elections, the Court held that the expenditure had to be reasonable, 
and the election material had to be related to corporate policy, rather than 
being of an emotive, personal, or misleading nature.87 While the directors had 
                                                 
79 Several findings of the National Office Report regarding s 286(1) of the Registered 
Organisations Act do not include the words ‘in what he believed to be’ in restating the 
section: see National Office Report, above n 9, Findings 41, 59, 65. 
80 See ASIC v Adler (2002) 168 FLR 253, [735]–[736] (Santow J); Australian Corporation Law 
Principles & Practice, above n 65 [3.2A.0070]. 
81 Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law, above n 64 [8.200]; see Mills v Mills (1938) 60 CLR 
150, 185 (Dixon J); Ngurli Ltd v McCann (1953) 90 CLR 425, 438–9 (Williams ACJ, 
Fullagar and Kitto JJ). 
82 Hannes v MJH Pty Ltd (1992) 7 ACSR 8. 
83 National Office Report, above n 9, ch 6 [626]–[633]. 
84 ASIC v Adler (2002) 168 FLR 253, [387] (Santow J). 
85 Australian Corporation Law Principles & Practice, above n 65 [3.2A.0115]; see Chameleon 
Mining NL v Murchison Metals Ltd [2010] FCA 1129, [676]. 
86 See generally Advance Bank Australia Ltd v FAI Insurances Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 464. 
87 Ibid 485 (Kirby P). 
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acted in good faith, their substantial purpose — that of seeking their own re-
election — was improper, and they were ordered to reimburse the bank.88 In 
the trade union context (albeit under now-repealed laws), the authorisation of 
such expenditure has been found to be improper,89 but only if it occurred 
during an official ‘election period’.90 This finding led Kirby P (as he then 
was) to reflect that, in interpreting the Corporations Law, ‘great care must be 
taken in applying, out of context, the decisions reached in the industrial 
relations sphere. Its peculiarities are notorious’.91 However, the subsequent 
harmonisation of organisational and corporate rules in this area means that 
this issue is probably moot. 
D Meaning of ‘Impropriety’ 
The third and fourth CLERP duties both relate to abuse of position, and are 
therefore particularly relevant to the examples discussed. The prohibitions 
common to the Corporations Act and the Registered Organisations Act 
provide that officials and employees ‘must not improperly’ use: 
• their position; or 
• information obtained because they hold, or did hold, their position, 
either to: 
(a) gain an advantage for themselves or someone else; or 
(b) cause detriment to the organisation or another person.92 
The Registered Organisations Act differs from the Corporations Act in that 
while a director or officer of a company is, under the latter Act, prohibited 
from causing ‘detriment to the corporation’, the former Act contains a broader 
prohibition against the causing of detriment ‘to the organisation or to another 
person’.93 
                                                 
88 Ibid; see also commentary in Australian Corporation Law Principles & Practice, above n 65 
[3.2A.0115]. 
89 Scott v Jess (1984) 3 FCR 263. 
90 Tanner v Maynes (1985) 7 FCR 432, 455 (Keeley J dissenting). 
91 Advance Bank Australia Ltd v FAI Insurances Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 464, 479 (Kirby P). 
92 Registered Organisations Act ss 287–8; Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 182–3. 
93 These words are also included in the Commonwealth Companies and Authorities Act 1997 
(Cth) ss 25–6; see also Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Bill 1998 (Cth) sch 5, s 11. 
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These duties are breached, whenever the use of a position or of information is 
‘improper’. The meaning of ‘improper’ is objective in that it: 
consists in a breach of the standards of conduct … expected of a person in 
the position of the… offender by reasonable persons with knowledge of the 
duties, powers and authority of the position and the circumstances of the 
case…94 
Conduct engaged in for an improper purpose (as discussed above) can also 
satisfy this criterion, and includes acts that the officer ‘knows or ought to 
know that he has no authority to do’.95 Indeed, it has been held that failures to 
act for a ‘proper purpose’, as discussed above, may violate this duty.96 
If impropriety is proven, it is immaterial whether the intended advantage was 
gained, or the detriment caused, since the purpose alone is sufficient.97 For 
instance, if a person acts in a transaction through which that person, or a 
person to whom they owe a duty, stands to gain an advantage, the failure to 
make adequate disclosure may alone constitute an improper use of position.98 
Similarly, a director who has transferred corporate money into a personal 
account, ostensibly because it was in the company’s best interest to do so, has 
improperly used his or her position, given that the director knew that doing so 
was outside the scope of his or her authority.99 
It seems that, for the purpose of these duties, any transaction will amount to 
gaining an ‘advantage’ or causing ‘detriment’, even if it were to satisfy a 
legitimate financial obligation, or where the balance sheet of the entity is 
unchanged on a net basis.100 For instance, an advantage was found to be 
gained by a director who facilitated payment of a debt that was owed to 
another company, without having disclosed that its sole owners were himself 
and his wife.101 In another matter, a director of a corporate trustee, in 
                                                 
94 R v Byrnes (1995) 183 CLR 501, 514–5 (Brennan, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). 
95 Ibid; see also Doyle v ASIC (2005) 227 CLR 18, 29 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne 
and Callinan JJ). 
96 Chameleon Mining NL v Murchison Metals Ltd [2010] FCA 1129, [676]. 
97 Chew v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 626 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Gaudron, McHugh JJ); see 
also Australian Corporation Law Principles & Practice, above n 65 [3.2A.0095]; Southern 
Resources Ltd v Residues Treatment and Trading Co Ltd (1990) 56 SASR 455, 478 
(Jacobs ACJ, Prior and Mullighan JJ), which suggests insider trading need not bear fruit for 
misuse of information to be proven. 
98 ASIC v Adler (2002) 168 FLR 253, [458] (Santow J); Australian Corporation Law Principles 
& Practice, above n 65 [3.2A.0095]. 
99 See R v Cook; Ex parte Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (1996) 130 FLR 354. 
100 Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law, above n 64 [9.282.6]. 
101 R v Donald [1993] 2 Qd R 680. 
142 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 18 NO 1 
authorising the sale of assets from a family trust to a new entity (albeit at full 
value) — and thus avoiding an anticipated claim from a creditor — was said 
to have gained an advantage by ‘being able to carry on the business which 
employed him under a fresh corporate structure unimpeded by the claim’. 
Indeed, because the sale was for an improper purpose, the fact that full value 
was obtained was irrelevant to the director breaching his duty.102 In light of 
these decisions, it would not be unreasonable to suggest that Jeff Jackson’s 
actions in directing to himself payment of additional salary from HSU funds 
would amount to a similar, improper use of position. 
Different views have been expressed as to what amounts to a ‘use of 
information’ (in contrast to a ‘use of position’), in the corporate context. At a 
minimum, it corresponds to the fiduciary duty of confidentiality, applicable to 
‘that type of information which equity would restrict a director from using to 
his personal profit’.103 On this view, a director who assisted other companies 
in their dealings with the former customers of his or her own company (which 
had ceased trading) would engage in a contravention.104 The broader view is 
that the duty applies to all information, whether it is of direct (as above) or 
indirect value. For example, it applied to a director who, knowing his 
company was to be liquidated, proceeded to change its name and register a 
second company in the original name, which was then used to carry on his 
business. The ‘information’ there was the risk of liquidation, a fact not in 
itself of great commercial value, but which did allow him to embark on a 
course of action that he would not have otherwise taken.105  
Given that the provision seems designed to protect commercially significant 
information — a great quantity of which a trade union is unlikely to have — 
there are conceivably fewer situations in which it could be invoked under the 
Registered Organisations Act than under the Corporations Act. One example, 
however, is a union’s membership data, which could be valuable in the 
marketing of industry-specific products, and also in fighting a union ‘turf 
war’. For instance, during the 1990s, the HSU’s NSW branch,106 largely 
through the efforts of Craig Thomson, engaged in a concerted effort to gain 
representation of psychologists, at the expense of the rival Public Service 
Association (‘PSA’). An order of the NSW Industrial Relations Commission 
                                                 
102 Jeffree v NCSC (1989) 15 ACLR 217. 
103 Australian Corporation Law Principles & Practice, above n 65 [3.2A.0100]; Rosetex Co Pty 
Ltd v Licata (1994) 12 ACSR 779, 783 (Young J). 
104 See generally Rosetex Co Pty Ltd v Licata (1994) 12 ACSR 779. 
105 See McNamara v Flavel (1988) 13 ACLR 619. 
106 Then known as the Health and Research Employees’ Association. 
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excluded the HSU from the field.107 Had that not occurred, the HSU could 
conceivably have obtained a PSA membership list from a sympathetic 
official, giving the HSU direct access to PSA members, and thus possibly 
causing the PSA to lose membership. Another example of valuable 
information held by a trade union might concern union contracts for services. 
Mention was earlier made of purchases from Urban Giftware by the HSU 
Victoria No 1 Branch, which was a related party of the then-President Pauline 
Fegan. If Fegan had provided ‘inside information’ that gave Urban Giftware 
(and by extension her partner) an advantage in a tender process, that could be 
considered a misuse of union information. Likewise, had Communigraphix 
tendered for the annual contract to produce HSU East’s magazine (which did 
not occur), Michael Williamson could have misused union information by 
giving Communigraphix an advantage in the tender process. Both these 
examples, in the author’s view, would more appropriately be classified as 
misuses of position, but they do show, in theory, that unions have valuable 
information for the purpose of this particular duty.  
IV CRIMES — COMMON LAW AND CORPORATE 
A Overview 
The previous section considered the duties applicable to union officials, and 
corporate directors and officers, under both the Registered Organisations Act 
and the Corporations Act. While the corporate and union contexts differ, the 
base behaviour to which the two laws respond is broadly similar. 
Where the two laws differ is in the area of criminality. While the 
Corporations Act contains specific criminal provisions for directors and 
officers who engage in serious breaches of their duties,108 those provisions 
were left out of the Registered Organisations Act. The effect of this omission 
is that, while a crime committed internally against a corporation can be dealt 
with specifically as a ‘criminal violation of financial trust’,109 factually similar 
offences occurring in a union context can be dealt with only under the general 
criminal law.  
                                                 
107 See Public Service Association (NSW) v Health and Research Employees’ Association 
(NSW) (1996) 92 IR 122; Health and Research Employees’ Association (NSW) v Public 
Service Association (NSW) (1997) 92 IR 158. 
108 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 184. 
109 As termed in Donald R Cressey, Other People’s Money: A Study in the Social Psychology of 
Embezzlement (Patterson Smith Publishing Corporation, 2nd ed, 1973) 11. 
144 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 18 NO 1 
Consequently, allegedly corrupt union officials have faced prosecution for a 
range of offences under the general criminal law. Norm Gallagher of the BLF, 
for instance, was charged with ‘corruptly receiving secret commissions’.110 
Craig Thomson is facing 154 charges of theft, obtaining financial advantage 
by deception, and dishonestly obtaining property by deception in Victoria.111 
Michael Williamson faces 50 charges in NSW, including charges of fraud, 
money laundering, publishing misleading statements (in respect of his wife’s 
company), and hindering an investigation.112 
This discussion considers the criminal breaches of duty established under 
CLERP, on the one hand, and the state criminal laws that apply to corrupt 
union officials on the other. Although the state criminal laws provide a viable 
alternative to specific offences, their object is not to punish a misuse of 
authority, or a betrayal of trust. Rather they penalise a broad class of 
unacceptable acts, within which such behaviour may fall. What might be 
thought of as the specific ‘immorality’ of betraying a trade union, in the 
author’s view, is not addressed by general criminal laws, and is therefore left 
unpunished. 
B Crimes under CLERP 
The criminal provisions contained in the Corporations Act are largely the 
same as their civil counterparts, save for the inclusion of a mens rea element. 
Simply put, a violation of those duties will be criminal if it was intentional or 
reckless. 
Where directors or officers fail (a) to act in good faith in the best interests of 
the corporation, and (b) to act for a proper purpose, they will commit an 
offence if their action or inaction was either: 
(a) reckless; or 
(b) intentionally dishonest.113  
                                                 
110 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 176. 
111 ‘Charge Sheet and Warrant to Arrest (Execution Copy)’ served on Craig Robert Thomson 
under the Magistrates’ Court Criminal Procedure Rules 2009, signed 30 January 2013 and 5 
February 2013 <http://michaelsmithnews.typepad.com/files/complete-craig-thomson-charge-
sheet-and-warrant-to-arrest-20130206.pdf>. 
112 Higgins, above n 59. 
113 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 184(1); defined in the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 
div 5. 
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By contrast, the provisions relating to misuse of position and information refer 
to dishonesty rather than impropriety. That is to say, directors or officers must 
dishonestly use their position, or information obtained through it: 
(a) with the intention of directly or indirectly gaining an advantage for 
themselves, or someone else, or causing detriment to the corporation; 
or 
(b) recklessly as to whether the use may result in they or someone else 
directly or indirectly gaining an advantage, or in causing detriment to 
the corporation.114 
It is important that ‘dishonesty’, defined objectively, be specifically proven 
for a charge to be made out. For instance, a director who failed to disclose an 
interest in two companies, and then participated in board decisions facilitating 
two lease agreements with them, was found to have acted dishonestly, having 
intended to gain an advantage for the companies.115 
C State Laws 
State criminal laws, as applicable to the case studies referred to in this article, 
do not apply specifically to the examples of disloyalty discussed here, but to a 
broad range of behaviour, which may not include all forms of officials’ 
misconduct. 
It is appropriate to commence discussion with Victoria and NSW, where the 
charges against Craig Thomson and Michael Williamson have been laid. The 
criminal law in these States, as also in South Australia, follows the common 
law, with property offences based on now-repealed provisions of the Theft Act 
1968 (UK).116 All have a ‘basic’ theft offence — a dishonest appropriation of 
property with the intention to permanently deprive the rightful owner of it117 
— plus a range of offences concerning obtaining property through deception 
or fraud. In Victoria and NSW, a person who ‘by any deception dishonestly 
                                                 
114 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 184(2)–(3). 
115 Kwok v The Queen (2007) 175 A Crim R 278; Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law, 
above n 64 [9.288]. 
116 Theft Act 1968 (UK) c 60, s 15, as repealed by the Fraud Act 2006 (UK) c 35, sch 1; see 
Department of Parliamentary Services (Cth), Bills Digest, No 105 of 1999–2000, 24 
November 1999, ‘Theft, Fraud, Bribery and Related Offences’; see also Model Criminal Law 
Officers Committee, Model Criminal Code Report: Chapter 3 — Theft, Fraud, Bribery and 
Related Offences (Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, 1995). 
117 Theft Act 1968 (UK) c 60, s 1; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 134; Crimes 
Act 1958 (Vic) s 72; Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 134. 
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obtains’ (as opposed to ‘appropriates’) the property of another is guilty of an 
offence.118 Offences applicable to obtaining ‘financial advantage’ are 
similarly worded. The criminal law in NSW, but not Victoria, also includes 
causing ‘financial disadvantage’.119 South Australia groups the notions of gain 
and loss together under the heading of ‘Deception’, an office offence which 
requires only that the deceit lead to a ‘benefit’ being accumulated or detriment 
being incurred.120 Interestingly, the United Kingdom has since abandoned the 
‘obtaining by deception’ approach in favour of specific offences including 
fraud by abuse of position, fraud by false representation, and dishonestly 
obtaining services.121 
Similar offences, albeit using the language of ‘stealing’, are used in the 
Australian criminal code jurisdictions. In Queensland and Western Australia, 
stealing is defined as ‘fraudulently’ taking or converting ‘anything capable of 
being stolen’. A person is guilty of the offence if the person acted with the 
requisite intent — for instance, the intent to permanently deprive the owner of 
the relevant goods.122 If the property is money, any intention to repay is 
considered irrelevant to whether or not the crime was committed.123 Likewise, 
it is immaterial that a person has a ‘special interest’ in the property taken, 
including as a lessee, a joint owner, or that the person is a ‘director or officer 
of a corporation or company or society who are the owners of it’.124 Tasmania 
utilises similar terminology, for example, in relation to the offence of ‘stealing 
by misappropriation’ (which consists of persons dishonestly using money they 
have received contrary to directions that were given).125 However, the 
Tasmanian code also contains a number of offences that respond to particular 
situations, such as conversion of trust property,126 and fraudulent 
misappropriation of corporate property.127 
                                                 
118 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 81; Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) pt 4AA (‘Fraud’), ss 192C, 192E. 
119 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 81; Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) pt 4AA (‘Fraud’), ss 192B, 192E. The 
NSW Act also includes causing ‘financial disadvantage’, as distinct from a botched attempt to 
gain an advantage that only causes a disadvantage. 
120 Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 139. 
121 Fraud Act 2006 (UK) c 35, ss 1–5. 
122 Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) sch 1 s 391; Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA) 
sch 1 s 371. 
123 Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) sch 1 s 391(2)(f); Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 
(WA) sch 1 s 371(2)(f). 
124 Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) sch 1 s 396; Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA) 
sch 1 s 376. 
125 Criminal Code Act 1921 (Tas) sch 1 s 231. 
126 Ibid s 260. 
127 Ibid s 261. 
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D A Moral and Practical Comparison 
It would be incorrect to suggest that a corrupt trade union official does not 
commit any of the above State crimes, since the charging of Thomson and 
Williamson clearly attests to the contrary. Upon an examination of their 
normative bases, however, it becomes clear that those State crimes are of a 
rather different nature from the corporate crimes (in that they stem from 
different ‘moral’ or ‘pre-legal’ notions), raising questions as to the desirability 
of the status quo. 
Offences such as theft or stealing, however labelled, reflect at their core a 
social norm — a distinct moral objection to the taking of the property of 
others. Not all activities which fall foul of this moral norm will necessarily be 
unlawful (for example, if I mistakenly take a coat from a cupboard, mistaking 
it for my own, its owner may perceive it as a moral theft, but, being 
unintended, it may not be a legal theft).128 Likewise, those offences labelled 
as fraud reflect a similar normative consensus against ‘deception’ — that is, 
against communicating untruths to others, intending such untruths to be 
believed.129 Normative rules aimed at certain types of behaviour do not supply 
the basis only for criminal offences. Fiduciary duties — and like provisions in 
the Corporations Act — also have a corresponding basis: a normative duty of 
loyalty,130 and a duty also to act in a beneficiary’s best interests.131 Laws 
which penalise breaches of duty are thus reflecting, at some level, a moral 
norm against disloyalty.  
The relevance of this is that the civil duties contained in the Corporations Act, 
and the criminal provisions related to them, do not specifically aim to prevent 
or punish acts of ‘stealing’ or ‘deception’, although that may be the practical 
effect of their application. Instead, they are intended as a deterrent to those 
who, being in a position of trust and confidence, would abuse such trust. That 
is partly why the Corporations Act has its own loyalty-based criminal 
provisions, which apply more generally to the management of entities, rather 
than to the use of property. For instance, Rodney Adler, having arranged the 
round-robin purchase of HIH Insurance shares using funds from a subsidiary 
(in an attempt to inflate the company’s share price), pleaded guilty to failing 
to act in good faith. His actions showed ‘an appalling lack of commercial 
morality’132 in that he put his own interests above those of his company, 
                                                 
128 Stuart P Green, Lying, Cheating, and Stealing: A Moral Theory of White-Collar Crime 
(Oxford University Press, 2006) 89–90. 
129 Ibid 76, 153. 
130 Ibid 103. 
131 Ibid 99. 
132 R v Adler (2005) 53 ACSR 471, 477 (Dunford J). 
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though he did not steal or obtain property by deception. Likewise, one might 
argue that officials in the HSU dishonestly misused their positions by 
exceeding their authority. It is hard to characterise Thomson’s expenditure of 
HSU funds in his campaign for Parliament as meeting the criteria for a 
property offence, although it certainly occurred for an improper purpose. In 
that sense, the general criminal law does not respond directly to his behaviour.  
Of course, there are other benefits to including the CLERP offences in the 
Registered Organisations Act. Reckless as well as intended acts may fall 
within the scope of the CLERP offences, though they would not be 
classifiable as fraud or theft. Similarly, given that modern trade unions are 
national bodies — having been so since amalgamation under the Hawke 
Government, when the minimum membership for registration of a trade union 
was increased from 1000 to 10 000 (originally proposed as 20 000), leading to 
the demise of many smaller, state-based unions133 — it makes sense that laws 
applicable to their officials should be uniform. Having a federal investigative 
agency (the General Manager of Fair Work) investigating civil violations of 
federal law parallel to any enquiry by state bodies (namely, the police forces) 
into criminal conduct has been shown by the HSU investigations to be 
unnecessary and inefficient.  
While it well may be, as one commentator has suggested, that ‘we can all be 
held liable for fraud or misappropriation of somebody else’s money’ under 
state crimes,134 that is not the basis of the CLERP offences. Their subject is 
not misappropriation or fraud, but disloyalty and abuses of trust and 
confidence. They are relational, not general, offences. 
V COMPARING PENALTIES 
Distinct from the appropriateness of civil compared to criminal provisions is 
the issue of the penalties available to courts that wish to punish union officials 
found guilty of corruption. Although the Corporations Act and the Registered 
Organisations Act impose common duties, there are important differences 
between the civil penalties available under the two statutes.  
                                                 
133 Industrial Relations Legislation Amendment Act 1990 (Cth) s 12; see also Commonwealth, 
Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 23 August 1990, 2079 (Senator Peter Cook, Minister for 
Industrial Relations). See generally Kevin Morgan, ‘Union Malaise Owes Much to Hawke 
Amalgamations’, The Australian (online), 7 June 2012 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/ 
national-affairs/opinion/union-malaise-owes-much-to-hawke-amalgamations/story-e6frgd0x-
1226386738662>. 
134 Joellen Riley’s contribution in ‘The Question’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 16 
June 2012 <http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/the-question-20120615-20f3f.html>. 
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The same categories of penalty are available for violations of a civil penalty 
provision in both laws, including pecuniary penalty orders,135 compensation 
orders,136 and other orders such as injunctions.137 However, while 
disqualification orders can be made under the Corporations Act,138 no similar 
express power exists under the Registered Organisations Act, although 
automatic disqualification was intended as a consequence of a pecuniary 
penalty (being a ‘prescribed order’) under the 2002 Bill.139 If, however, a 
person is convicted of a ‘prescribed offence’ they thereby become ineligible 
to run for or hold office in an organisation. The person ceases after 28 days 
from conviction to hold any positions held at the time of conviction (subject 
to appeal).140 A ‘prescribed offence’ is defined as including any offence under 
the laws of the ‘Commonwealth, a State or Territory, or another country, 
involving fraud or dishonesty and punishable on conviction by imprisonment 
for a period of 3 months or more’.141 
A significant difference between the two laws is the maximum pecuniary 
penalty a court can impose. However, a recent rise in the value of penalty 
units from $110 to $170,142 combined with amendments to the Registered 
Organisations Act in 2012,143 has, to the extent of those increases, narrowed 
the divide. Under the Corporations Act, a maximum penalty of $200 000 can 
be ordered,144 while the ceiling under the Registered Organisations Act is 
significantly lower, at 60 penalty units for an individual ($10 020 total).145 
This represents a significant increase from the previous 20 penalty units (or 
$2200, based on $110 penalty units).146  
Regardless of this change, it is not clear why misdeeds in the union context 
are treated more leniently than in the corporate sphere. After all, both are 
betrayals of the entities’ members — for the corporation, its owners and 
                                                 
135 Registered Organisations Act s 306; Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1317G. 
136 Registered Organisations Act s 307; Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 1317H–1317HB. 
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shareholders, and for unions, their paid membership — and the normative 
moral bases of both offences are fundamentally the same. Of course, one 
might argue, as the report of the Australian Council of Trade Unions’ 
Independent Panel on Best Practice for Union Governance (‘ACTU Panel’) 
seems to,147 that the goal of such provisions is to only deter, not punish, those 
who would engage in misconduct. This is disagreeable. Penalties also exist to 
penalise, particularly in cases like the present, where proverbial ‘teeth’ are 
required to deal with genuine offenders. Indeed, unless it raises the amount 
that an official can be fined, there is a real risk that the civil penalties regime 
will be perceived by law enforcement agencies as imposing overly lenient 
penalties, leading to more criminal prosecutions than are necessary.  
VI OFFENCES OVER OBLIGATIONS? 
Putting to one side the strengths and weaknesses of the civil penalties regime, 
the suggested inclusion of criminal provisions for officials in the Registered 
Organisations Act remains contentious. In the view of the ACTU Panel, there 
is no justification for ‘cluttering the statute books with further, likely 
ineffective criminal sanctions’.148 The assumptions supporting this conclusion 
are, however, questionable: 
We subscribe to the view that the greatest disinfectant is sunlight. 
Appropriate disclosure of practice and policies is likely to do more to 
prevent any malpractice than shiploads of punitive sanctions for breach of 
standards. Where people are moved to embark on actual, deliberate 
dishonesty, fear of the already applicable criminal law as to fraud or of the 
many civil proscriptions will not reliably hold them back.149  
While the emphasis on prevention has merit, particularly in encouraging good 
conduct and discouraging poor conduct — such as an official’s self-payment 
of excessive remuneration150 — it ignores the possibility that misconduct 
nevertheless occurs, and thus says nothing about how the perpetrators should 
be treated. This is problematic for those who argue that the purpose of 
criminal law is not to deter, but to punish unacceptable conduct. Even if it is 
said to deter wrongdoing, research suggests that the public shame of even a 
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potential prosecution, for a professional, may be more effective than a 
monetary penalty (whether or not charges are brought).151 
A more relevant point is the Panel’s observation that ASIC has ‘not been 
much attracted’ to the use of criminal proceedings.152 Unfortunately, this 
statement is somewhat dishonest. A search of the ASIC website uncovers an 
abundance of media releases referring to prosecutions in which ASIC has 
taken part. 
Alternatively, it may be argued that ASIC’s preference to utilise the civil 
penalties regime illustrates a lack of faith in the criminal provisions.153 This 
again is overly simplistic. It is true, as the Panel suggested, that the criminal 
offences require a higher standard of proof than do the civil penalty 
provisions.154 But to suggest that this alone is why ASIC has a preference for 
civil penalties is a gross generalisation. Like the police, ASIC does not pursue 
each report of misconduct under the criminal law. To employ the criminal law 
in every instance would be highly arbitrary, leading to an overly severe — and 
frankly unfair — response in many cases. Indeed, where an investigation has 
potential criminal implications, ASIC does consult with the Commonwealth 
Director of Public Prosecutions (‘CDPP’) on how the matter should 
proceed.155 Which option is appropriate in a given situation is a matter of 
policy. After all, not all breaches of duty are comparable to those of a Rodney 
Adler or a Michael Williamson. 
This comparison, one might suggest, raises another question: why should only 
these particular persons — a company director and a union official — face 
such offences? This goes to what might be called a ‘public interest’ argument. 
Both owe the same essential fiduciary duty to those who have reposed in them 
a ‘substantial confidence’, trusting these fiduciaries to act on their behalf.156 It 
could be argued, on this basis alone, that all fiduciary relationships should be 
backed up by criminal law. However, these particular relationships — as 
between a company’s shareholders and directors, and a union’s membership 
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and its officials — are distinct from other fiduciary relationships. In company 
or union relationships, the beneficiaries are a public class, and the fiduciaries 
may be responsible for quite vast sums (the HSU National Office, for 
instance, had revenue of over $2 million for 2007–08).157 What sets them 
apart, and therefore warrants additional protections, is their fundamentally 
‘public character’. The dual civil–criminal model established by CLERP 
recognises this, and affords such relationships a necessarily greater level of 
protection. The CLERP model, it should be noted, also applies to 
Commonwealth public servants.158 
Consistency is also a consideration. While it is undoubtedly true that ‘unions 
are not like corporations’,159 there is a real question as to why, in cases where 
an official and director have engaged in practically identical misconduct, with 
similar intentions, the legal response differs depending on whether the victim 
entity was a trade union or a corporation. Why one should face a more severe 
punishment than the other is less than clear. 
Another argument, to which the ACTU Panel makes reference,160 is that the 
vast majority of union officials are law-abiding, and therefore it is 
unnecessary to establish further criminal offences. Of course, the same 
argument can be made about many criminal offences. The vast majority of 
Australians are unlikely to kill their neighbours, loot their houses, or force 
them into non-consensual sexual acts, so why should that behaviour be 
criminalised? This argument should sound no less absurd in a union context. 
Simply because certain behaviour is an aberration does not mean it should be 
treated any less harshly. 
The HSU saga may well be an aberration among trade unions, but the 
inclusion of offences for officials in the Registered Organisations Act would 
not change that. Officials would not be charged with an offence for all 
breaches of duty. Criminal charges would be reserved for serious violations 
where  mens rea can be proven to the higher evidentiary standard of ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’,161 rather than on the balance of probabilities.162 
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If this results in the provisions being underutilised, that should be seen as a 
positive — much like a fire alarm protected by glass because its activation has 
not been required — rather than as a sign of ineffectiveness. Such laws should 
be available, in the hope that the circumstances requiring their use will never 
arise. 
VII CIVIL PENALTIES AND ‘NON-OFFICIAL’ UNION 
EXECUTIVES 
An aspect of the HSU investigations that has largely passed without 
discussion is the standard of care owed by ‘non-official’ union executives, 
who occupy positions analogous to corporate non-executive directors.  
In the Fair Work report, Michael Williamson is quoted as saying that his role 
as HSU National President was purely honorary. He felt no obligation to 
participate in the administration of the National Office — particularly given 
that he was based in NSW, while the National Office was in Victoria; he also 
noted that he did not sit on the Finance Committee.163 Instead, his role, for 
which he earned $20 000 annually, involved the chairing of meetings but  no 
supervision of the executive.164 Unsurprisingly, this was met with criticism 
from Fair Work, which concluded that he should have actively supervised 
Craig Thomson, and acted to establish proper policies for credit card issuance 
and expenditure.165 
Although Williamson is probably a poor representation of such ‘honorary’ 
officials, it is worthwhile considering the role of union executives who do not 
participate in the daily running of the union, particularly in regard to their 
duty to exercise a ‘reasonable’ level of care and diligence.166 As mentioned 
above, the duties of corporate non-executive directors are generally limited to 
financial matters, with the exception of the non-executive chairman, whose 
further duties often reflect that person’s particular skills and expertise. 
Williamson’s argument is accordingly weak, given not only his analogous 
role as ‘non-official’ President, but also his considerable experience in 
operating a union branch (analogous to the accounting background of John 
Greaves at One.Tel). 
An official’s duty to exercise care and diligence requires that they do so as a 
reasonable person would if they were (a) ‘an officer of an organisation… in 
                                                 
163 National Office Report, above n 9, ch 11 [4]. 
164 Ibid ch 11 [9]. 
165 Ibid ch 20 [126], [173]–[175]. 
166 Registered Organisations Act s 285(1). 
154 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 18 NO 1 
the organisation’s circumstances’, and (b) ‘occupied the office held by, and 
had the same responsibilities within the organisation … as the officer’.167 
This emphasis on context means that, compared to non-executive directors, 
non-official union executives may argue that they are under no ‘continuing 
obligation’ to monitor a union’s finances, beyond attending executive 
meetings. Particularly in federal unions, there are chairs at the table that are 
provided solely for representative purposes (so that groups, in particular state 
branches and constituent organisations, have a voice). For example, 14 
representatives from branches sit on the National Executive of the AWU, as 
against eight members who hold official positions including those of 
Secretary, President, Assistant Secretary and Vice-President.168 Certainly, the 
Fair Work report into the HSU National Office seems to indicate that 
members of its National Executive and its Finance Committee did not actively 
monitor Craig Thomson’s activities, although whether they could have done 
so is another matter. 
Certainly, it seems that Parliament’s intention in adopting the corporate 
language in the Registered Organisations Act was to bring the standard of 
care of union officials into line with that of company directors.169 However, 
because a non-executive official’s duties are subjective to the organisation 
itself (depending on who it represents and what activities it engages in), and 
because union executives function differently from a corporate board, their 
obligations may be less strict than those of directors. Nevertheless, assuming 
that they have been given access to all relevant information (which was not 
the case in the HSU), it would be hard to fathom an official not having read at 
least some of it, if not out of curiosity, then because its contents are the 
subject of discussion at a given meeting.  
Whether this is desirable is a question which concerns the practical role of a 
union executive; in particular, it would be relevant to ask whether it is an 
actual committee of management, or a forum that merely provides 
representation to constituent groups. While that would no doubt be an 
interesting discussion, it is one best left to another occasion. 
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VIII AUSTRALIA’S INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INSTITUTIONS 
AND MISCONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS 
It is worthwhile considering the role that Australia’s industrial relations 
institutions play in investigating misconduct. In particular, the Fair Work 
investigation into the National Office of the HSU, conducted by the General 
Manager of Fair Work, faced significant public criticism. Fair Work President 
Ian Ross lamented that, despite their separate operations, the General 
Manager’s investigation had ‘significantly damaged the [Fair Work] 
Tribunal’s reputation’.170  
The main criticisms made of the Fair Work investigation were two-fold. First, 
although the lead investigator believed otherwise,171 the public perception was 
that the process had taken an inordinate amount of time. Craig Thomson 
himself noted this,172 having had questions about his integrity left unanswered 
in the public domain for almost four years, something which caused an 
avoidable level of personal distress. The observation was made by Opposition 
Leader Tony Abbott in early 2012 that: 
The Fitzgerald Royal Commission in Queensland went for well under three 
years, [as did] the Wood Royal Commission in NSW [into police 
corruption] … the Cole Royal Commission into the building industry, just 
18 months; I fail to see why this investigation is taking so long.173 
As the General Manager of Fair Work herself noted,174 the investigation into 
the HSU was only the second undertaken since the commencement of the 
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relevant provisions of the Registered Organisations Act in 2002. The National 
Office investigation began as an ‘inquiry’ on 6 April 2009 (under the former 
Industrial Registry), and continued from 1 July under the Fair Work General 
Manager. It then made the transition to an ‘investigation’ on 26 March 
2010.175 The final report was completed two years later on 28 March 2012. 
One can question, given the relatively few opportunities it had had to gain 
experience, whether Fair Work had the expertise to run such an investigation, 
compared to ASIC, which is more regularly engaged in such processes. 
Indeed, it does not seem from the credentials of the lead Fair Work 
investigators, Terry Nassios and Ailsa Carruthers — both long-serving 
members of the Industrial Registry — that they had any specific experience 
relevant to running a quasi-criminal investigation (although their findings are 
not being questioned here). Such concerns were expressed in the process 
review of the National Office investigation which was conducted by KPMG 
(commissioned by the General Manager, who in announcing it acknowledged 
that the investigation had taken ‘an unreasonably long time’),176 which found 
that, throughout most of the investigation, the investigators continued to fulfil 
their ‘business as usual’ responsibilities.177 This raises further questions about 
whether adequate resources were dedicated to the investigation. 
The second major criticism relates to the Fair Work General Manager’s 
dealings with State police and the CDPP. In particular, requests for co-
operation from Victoria and NSW Police were refused by Fair Work on the 
basis of legal advice that it needed an express power of ‘referral’ to provide 
such co-operation, and also because Fair Work had no jurisdiction over state 
matters.178 This position, said to be based on unpublished advice from Corrs 
Chambers Westgarth Lawyers and the Australian Government Solicitor,179 is 
not only perplexing, but dangerous. It would suggest that, absent an express 
power, no government agency may deal with police, in effect needing the 
Parliament’s permission to do so. It is unfortunate that the government 
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responded to this by subsequently including an express power of referral 
within the Act,180 rather than rejecting the suggestion entirely (at least to the 
extent that dealings with police are prohibited without such a provision). It is 
perplexing, however, as a matter of consistency, that this power of referral 
was expressly included in ASIC’s legislation.181  
Fair Work also misunderstood the CDPP’s role within the Registered 
Organisations Act. The Act does provide for action in the case of 
contraventions (for example, the making of threats, electoral interference, and 
the obstructing of auditors), which Fair Work can investigate, and refer to the 
CDPP ‘for action in relation to possible criminal offences’.182 Fair Work 
seemed to believe, however, that the possibility of ‘criminal offences’ was to 
be determined under general criminal law by the CDPP.183 The CDPP 
subsequently did what Fair Work felt it could not; it provided the findings to 
state police.184 
It may be appropriate for a specialist body such as Fair Work to co-ordinate 
misconduct investigations in the industrial relations sphere. However, the 
irregularity with which it did so, and the evident difficulties of the HSU 
investigation, seem to indicate that, compared to an ASIC investigation in the 
corporate sphere, such an arrangement would simply be inefficient. Allocating 
the enforcement and investigation functions of Fair Work to a separate, 
specialised body, for example the ‘Registered Organisations Commission’ 
which the Coalition proposes, is unlikely to change this.185 Although union 
regulation may have its peculiarities, it is not intellectually impenetrable to the 
outside world. The Commonwealth might consider shifting the function to a 
general misconduct body, such as the Australian Crime Commission (perhaps 
renamed as the ‘Crime and Misconduct Commission’, as its equivalent in 
Queensland is called), which retains the proper expertise.  
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IX CONCLUSION 
The HSU–Thomson saga has exposed gaping holes in how Australian law 
responds to higher end, white-collar misconduct by trade union officials. 
Although the penalties available under the law have been raised, the 
Registered Organisations Act remains flawed with respect to officials’ duties, 
and must be brought into line with the Corporations Act. 
Trade union officials, like directors, are not incorruptible, and are in a position 
to abuse the trappings of office (although it is increasingly hard to do so). It is 
naïve to suggest that some ‘alternative’ solution, such as an inter-union 
grievance mechanism,186 or greater disclosure, is the appropriate response to 
such behaviour. A corrupt trade unionist should face the same penalties, civil 
or criminal, as would a corporate director or public servant, had they been 
engaged in exactly the same conduct. As it stands, corrupt officials are treated 
unnecessarily leniently, a practice that must end. The Coalition parties’ 
commitment to amending the law in this regard after the 2013 election is a 
welcome development. 
That corrupt behaviour may be rare or isolated is no defence to the 
inadequacies of the Registered Organisations Act. Although civil penalties, 
for the most part, are an adequate response to misconduct, criminal provisions 
are needed to punish particularly gross violations of duty. Such violations 
must be dealt with directly as acts of disloyalty, and not under the same 
provisions that bind petty criminals. Like directors and public servants, trade 
union officials hold a form of public office; if anything, the democratic 
structure of trade unions makes them even stronger candidates for that status. 
Those to whom they are ultimately responsible are vulnerable to their 
misconduct, and merit strong protection. The public has an interest in 
ensuring that such misconduct is appropriately punished. 
Industrial relations will always be a contentious area in Australian politics. It 
is important, however, that ideological divisions do not see individuals who, 
for all intents and purposes, have engaged in a corrupt enterprise treated more 
lightly because their victim was a particular entity. A miscreant is a miscreant, 
whether their job is that of a trade union official or a corporate director, and 
the punishment for misconduct should be the same for both. The HSU saga, 
beyond its political ramifications, represents a fundamental failing of the 
Registered Organisations Act, a failing that can easily be remedied with the 
proven formula of the Corporations Act. 
                                                 
186 Ewan Hannan, ‘HSU Prompts Union Watchdog’, The Australian (online), 27 July 2012 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/industrial-relations/hsu-prompts-union-
watchdog/story-fn59noo3-1226436191550>. 
